Outside of the recent past, excess reserves have only concerned policymakers in one other period: the Great Depression. The data show that excess reserves in the 1930s were never actively unwound through a reduction in the monetary base. Nominal economic growth swelled required reserves while an exogenous reduction in monetary gold inflows due to war embargoes in Europe allowed excess reserves to naturally decline towards zero. Excess reserves fell rapidly in early 1941 and would have unwound fully even without the entry of the United States into World War II. As such, policy tightening was at no point necessary and could have contributed to the 1937-1938 Recession.
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and Wheelock 2011; Park and Van Horn 2015) . However, to our knowledge, no study has studied the determinants of the fall of excess reserves in the early 1940s.
Our analysis indicates that the cessation of the largely exogenous gold flows is the only factor that can explain the sudden decline in excess reserves in early 1941. Between the trough of the Great Depression in 1933 and the end of WWII, excess reserves fell in only two periods. As gold inflows were slowing after the gold bloc countries had devalued in 1936, excess reserves declined and had almost reached zero before the Recession of 1937-1938 increased them again.
The cessation of gold flows from Europe during the war correspond to the more permanent decline in excess reserves started in early 1941. Excess reserves were on track to have unwound fully even without the issuance of war bonds or increase in reserve requirements in late 1941. 3 As such, policy tightening was unnecessary and may have been counterproductive. We take this as evidence that gold inflows were too large and the returns to alternative investments too low for banks to fully invest their excess reserves in other available assets.
We use three approaches to test this theory. First, we construct a residual model that is able to accurately predict changes in excess reserves from 1934 to 1941 using only gold flows, income, reserve requirements, and money in circulation. Second, we empirically show that gold inflows are the only variable robustly correlated with changes in excess reserves. Finally, we show that new excess reserves were disproportionately concentrated in New York City where gold flows entered the country, and that the effect of gold was several times larger for New York City banks than other banks around the country.
The Recovery from the Great Depression
While prices, income, and production declined steadily after the stock market crash in October of 1929 (Figure 1 ), the banking system remained relatively unaffected until November of 1930 when the failure of Caldwell and Company (a key southern financial institution) set off a chain reaction across the banking system. 4 Banking panics continued intermittently until March of 1933. Fears that the newly elected Roosevelt administration would depreciate the dollar after taking office led to a drain of gold out of the system. By March, the New York Federal Reserve 3 Bank had no more free gold and could not honor any additional gold withdrawals. Spilling over just after his inauguration, the panic gave Roosevelt the impetus to take dramatic action by implementing a Bank Holiday. Banks were closed, their books were examined, and only solvent banks were permitted to reopen. When the dust settled, over 4,000 banks were shut down permanently (Wicker 2000) .
Roosevelt took additional steps to stabilize the currency and prevent gold outflows. In 1933, he suspended convertibility of the dollar into gold, restricted gold exports, and forced the sale of all private gold holdings to the Federal Reserve. 5 The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 formally lowered the value of the dollar from $20.67 to $35 per troy ounce of gold and ended the crawling depreciation that had begun in 1933. Significant gold inflows began almost immediately after capital controls were lifted and largely continued until the outbreak of WWII (Meltzer 2003 ).
The banking system began to recover after 1933 and the ratio of currency to deposits steadily declined. However, instead of returning to their prior portfolio allocations, banks began to hold tremendous amounts of excess reserves (Figure 2 ). While excess reserves had been near zero before 1929, they grew rapidly from about $400 million in April of 1933 to about $3 billion in December 1935. The Fed was extremely concerned about the large excess reserve balances. In a press release by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) on December 17 th , 1935, the Board of Governors argued the gold flows were "excessive", and the FOMC resolved to absorb the resulting excess reserves as soon as such action would be possible without undue risk (Meltzer 2003, p. 498) . 6 Excess reserves began to decline in early 1936, and were on a path to reach zero by late 1937. The sudden decline of excess reserves, however, stoked the administration's fears about inflationary bottlenecks in 1936 and led to an increase in reserve requirements, the sterilization of gold inflows, and fiscal tightening as the federal budget moved 5 Roosevelt instructed the Treasury to purchase gold at $29.62 an ounce and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to purchase gold above that. The Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act gave the President the authority to expand the monetary base and change the gold parity (Meltzer, 2003, p. 578, Footnote 74) . 6 The FOMC (December 1935, p.11) states: "It is the view of the Committee, however, that the amount of excess reserves of member banks constitutes a source of danger …. The Committee believes, therefore, that action should be taken as soon as possible without undue risk to absorb a part of these excess reserves as a safeguard against possible dangers …." The FOMC (January 21, 1936, p. 4 ) later reaffirmed their intentions: "The Committee recognizes that the risks of action are somewhat increased by the present budgetary situation, but it recognizes also that the longer action is delayed, the greater and the dangers resulting from the combination of inordinately large excess reserves and an unbalanced budgetary situation, and the greater will be the difficulty of taking remedial action. Viewing the situation as a whole, the Committee strongly believes that action looking towards a substantial reduction in excess reserves should be taken as soon as this may be feasible …." 4 towards balance (Bloomfield 1950, p. 233; Meltzer 2003, p. 505-509; Eggertsson 2008) . 7 As the recession worsened, policymakers reversed these contractionary policies. The Treasury released the entire sterilization account balance of $1.2 billion, the Fed lowered reserve requirements back down in April 1938, Congress increased spending, and the Recession ended by the end of the year (Irwin 2012) . While there was some discussion of reducing reserve balances in 1939, concerns about higher interest rates relating to imminent war in Europe meant that inaction largely prevailed until the United States entered WWII (Meltzer 2003, p. 547-548) .
While excess reserves declined through 1936, the ensuing recession caused excess reserves to surge again. Over and above the return to the lower pre-1936 reserve requirements, the growth of excess reserves was further accelerated by the release of the sterilization account.
It was not until early 1941 that the growth reversed. Excess reserves declined by 14 percent over the first quarter of the year and had been more than cut in half by the end of the year. Excess reserves continued their decline throughout the war before bottoming out in early 1944.
As argued by Eichengreen (1996) , the Bank Holiday in 1933 and devaluation of the dollar against gold in 1934 were a major impetus for the recovery from the Great Depression.
Authors such as Eggertsson (2008) portray these policy changes as leaving the gold standard, but the new regulations likely amplified the effect of monetary gold coming into the country. Unlike previous periods when gold inflows could be held outside the banking system, all the incoming gold after 1934 was immediately exchanged for newly created money base as private gold holdings were only permitted for nonmonetary uses (Bullock, 1934; Richardson et al. 2013). 8 Specifically, gold flowing into the United States came to New York City's gold market. The New York City bank holding this gold would then sell to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (working on behalf of the Treasury) in exchange for credit to the banks' reserve accounts. 9 These 7 There is an active debate over whether the rise in reserve requirements caused the recession. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Velde (2009) argue that the increase in reserve requirements caused tight monetary conditions, whereas Cargill and Mayer (2006) , Calomiris, Mason, and Wheelock (2011), and Park and Van Horn (2015) argue it had little effect on bank behavior 8 Section 2 of the Gold Reserve Act transferred all private monetary gold to the Treasury at the old rate of $20.67. As the gold was immediately devalued by 59 percent, these capital gains were used to fund the Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund (Section 10) which could buy or sell gold, securities, and foreign currencies to stabilize the dollar's value at the new parity of $35 per troy ounce. Section 5 and 6 prohibited the Treasury from redeeming gold for dollars on demand, and instead forced all gold to be redeemed for dollars (Richardson et al. 2013) . 9 The Treasury issued a gold certificate in order to purchase the gold from the Federal Reserve Bank (Bloomfield 1950, p. 229) . The Exchange Equalization Fund, a division of the Treasury, could have made purchases or sold gold, but in practice most sales occurred directly with the Treasury (Bloomfield 1950, p. 151). funds could be used to purchase goods and securities, make loans, or remain at the Fed as excess reserves. Monetary gold increased from $8.19 to $22.76 billion between 1934 from $8.19 to $22.76 billion between and 1941 from $8.19 to $22.76 billion between . Romer (1992 shows that this increase in the money stock was the main factor driving the economic recovery and that Real GNP would have been nearly 50 percent below its pre-Depression trend rather than back to normal in 1942 if the growth of money supply had continued at the pre-Depression trend. Only two periods since 1918 have seen monetary base increases averaging over 20 percent a year: 1933-1945 and 2008-2014 . While the Fed and Treasury still had the ability to directly create high-powered money, increases in monetary gold constituted 96 percent of the all new high-powered money created between February 1934 and November 1941, as can be seen in Figure 3 .
The Fed used open-market operations sparingly during this period and it was not until they pegged interest rates during the war that open market operations returned with any regularity. Instead, reserve requirements were the Fed's primary remaining tool (Carlson and Wheelock 2014) . The question is then: If the Fed was not responsible for the unwinding of excess reserves than what was? The rest of the paper attempts to understand what factors caused the large rise in excess reserves and what caused their precipitous fall in the early 1940s.
Explanations for the Rise and Fall of Excess Reserves
There is a large literature on reserves during the Great Depression. While many papers argue that the supply of gold was responsible for the rise in money supply and total reserves (e.g., Hanes 2006) , this literature by and large has not explicitly examined the effect on excess reserves. Moreover, there are several other theories for the rise of excess reserves that also must be examined. We start by examining the importance of gold flows and then explore whether any other hypothesis can explain the sudden unwinding of excess reserves in early 1941.
Gold Inflows
The inflow of international gold between 1934 and 1941 dramatically increased the amount of high powered money in the economy. To the extent that banks did not have a large variety of good investment options, the sheer magnitude of expansion could have overwhelmed banks and fluctuations in gold flows thus might correspond to the fluctuations in excess reserves.
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While domestic production was stimulated by the gold price increase and unlimited Treasury purchases, Figure 4 shows that their increase was small compared to international flows. As labeled in the Figure and discussed in Section 6, the spikes in gold inflows correspond to international events or currency speculation rather than domestic events. The New York Federal Reserve (1936, pp. 10, 12) was well aware of these flows and their effect on reserves:
The principal cause of the continued increase in member bank reserve in 1936, as in 1934 and 1935 , was a heavy inflow of capital to this country from abroad, accompanied by gold shipments to the United States on a large scale… therefore, an increasing amount of attention was directed to the consideration of means of preventing gold imports from causing further increases in bank reserves, and there was also renewed discussion of the advisability of further action by the Federal Reserve System to reduce the existing volume of excess reserves. Indeed, the Figure shows a tight connection between international gold flows and excess reserves. The early rise in excess reserves from 1934-1937 corresponds to gold inflows from counties before they went off gold, and the late rise from 1938-1941 corresponds to gold inflows from counties fearing the start of WWII (Bloomfield 1950, p. 15 ). 10 Even though gold did not stop flowing into the country, the period of sterilization corresponds to a sudden drop in excess reserves and its release corresponds to a sudden rise. Gold flows also can explain the specific timing of the unwinding of excess reserve, as gold flows dried up due to international capital controls right before excess reserves dramatically declined in early 1941.
Precautionary Demand and Risk-Aversion
A commonly reported motive for the buildup of excess reserves after 1933 is precautionary demand. Popularized by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) , this theory argues that banks demanded excess reserves in response to the bank runs of the early 1930s. During the Great Depression, banks found it hard to borrow funds from other banks, and faced both stigma and rationing when using the Fed's discount window (Gorton and Metrick 2013) . Banks thus might have increased their excess reserves to protect against additional bank runs. 11 7 Others have expanded on this view. Frost (1971) argues that banks have a kinked demand curve for excess reserves based on the level of short-term interest rates. When short-term interest rates are high, banks have an incentive to invest short term and pay the penalty if they need to borrow at the Fed. However, when short-term interest rates are low (as they were during the 1930s), then banks have an incentive to hold more reserves to avoid penalties. Calomiris and Wilson (2004) argue that banks used excess reserves as a positive signal to customers. Therefore, rather than holding excess reserves in anticipation of bank runs, banks held them to reassure depositors and thus lower the probability of a bank run. As discussed in other contexts (Muir 2017; Guiso et al. 2013) , this precautionary demand effect can also be thought of as increased risk-aversion by banks in response to the extreme shocks of the Depression.
As predicted by these theories, excess reserves more than doubled over late-1933 and 1934 . That said, the explanations are a stretch to explain the continued buildup after 1934. 12 Not only did the installation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation calm nerves, but it is unlikely that banks and individuals were still fearful of illiquidity more than two years after the last bank run. Tobin (1965, p. 472) for instance posits: "Did bankers never take heart again, even when the deposit-currency ratio was rising and bank runs seemed to be a thing of the past?"
Excess reserve growth only accelerated after 1934, leaving banks with significantly more reserves than could have been expected to walk out the door. For instance, the ratio of reserves to individual deposits in New York City reached over 45 percent by the end of the decade.
The theories also do not offer much insight into the sudden decline of excess reserves at the beginning of 1941. If anything, the lead up to WWII should have reduced confidence in financial markets rather than strengthened it. For instance, WWI caused a financial shock that led to the temporary closure of the New York stock market and the issue of emergency currency through the Aldrich-Vreeland Act (Silber 2007, Jacobson and Tallman 2015) .
Alternative Assets
Another strand of the excess reserves literature points toward the costs and returns of non-reserve assets. As long as the cost of finding a good investment was higher than its return, 8 banks would have held onto their reserves rather than invest. 13 Arguably the most well-cited of these views comes from Bernanke (1983) . His "non-monetary" channel suggests that the Great Depression increased the costs of screening and monitoring borrowers. 14 As banks reduce costs by developing relationships with repeated customers, the large number of bank failures left a gap in knowledge. The theory posits that banks reduced their lending and built up excess reserves rather than pay the high costs of making loans. Wilcox (1982) also argues that banks were also discouraged from investing in long-term and relatively liquid bonds because yields were declining through most of the period. Banks thus received a lower return in the short-run, and When other assets have high costs or low returns, banks likely would have had few investment options for the massive rise in reserves and thus would have held onto a large portion of the new funds. The pattern of excess reserves would then be dictated by fluctuations in the money supply and money multiplier until investment returns had improved to the extent that the new funds could be fully used. 13 Though subsuming theories related to liquidity and the zero-lower bound (e.g., Krugman 1998 and Blinder 2000) , neither a liquidity preference nor a zero interest rate is required for banks to prefer reserves to alternative assets. 14 Mounts, Sowell, and Saxena (2000) also argue that banks faced high internal adjustment costs. 15 While Wilcox finds that interest rates explain a large proportion of excess reserves during the 1930s, Hanes (2006) posits that interest rates were influenced by the demand for reserves. Specifically, Hanes argues that since cash is an asset free of interest-rate risk, the demand for reserve is inversely related to the level of long-term interest rates when other short-term rates are zero. As such, the effect of interest rates on reserves is likely bidirectional.
Reserve Requirements
Changes in excess reserves are also mechanically tied to the reserve requirement. A rise in the reserve requirement could be met by either (1) depositing more money at the Fed thus raising total reserves but leaving excess reserves the same or (2) allowing excess reserves to be automatically converted into required reserves thus leaving total reserves the same. Since banks during the 1930s held ample excess reserves, even a large increase in the reserve requirement could have been fully met by a decline in excess reserves.
For each type of deposit (demand or time) and each class of bank (country, city, reserve city) there is an associated reserve requirement. The first reserve requirement increases since 1917 occurred in 1936 and 1937 with increases of 50 percent and 25 percent. The arrival of a recession quickly reversed the government's policies. The Fed also raised reserve requirements in November of 1941 in order to slow the post-Recession inflation. The change in reserve requirements in 1941 corresponds to a decline in excess reserves from $5 billion to $3.6 billion from October to November of 1941. However, this decline was just a continuation of the larger downward trend from $6.8 billion in January of 1941. While excess reserves did increase slightly as the war was winding down, they remained roughly constant for the rest of the WWII period.
As such, reserve requirement increases cannot explain the unwinding of excess reserves.
Expansion of Income
The rebounding economy could also have had led to a natural decline in the banking system's excess reserves. Assuming banks were holding a target level of total reserves rather than as a fraction of deposits, new deposits could be used to make loans or purchase securities, and the only change would be that the level of required reserves would increase and the level of excess reserves would decrease. However, income fluctuations do not correspond well with the growth and decline in excess reserves. Personal income and deposits were rising through most of the period. This growth caused a steady rise in required reserves, but banks continued to expand their excess reserves. There was also no sudden spike in income that could explain the fall in excess reserves during early 1941, and the sudden rise in deposits occurs several months after excess reserves had begun to fall. Any decline in excess reserves caused by a rise in income was obscured by other factors until 1941.
War Financing
Rather than explaining the rise in excess reserves during the 1930s, the WWII bond campaign is one potential explanation for the decline in excess reserves during the 1940s. 
A Residual Model of Excess Reserve Accumulation
Building off the statements of the Fed and other policy-makers as well as aggregate statistics, we previously observed that the level of gold inflows seems to match increases in the level of excess reserves. This appears to be consistent with a model where banks receive new reserves through gold inflows, but do not reallocate those reserves due to the lack of alternative assets presenting a more attractive risk-adjusted return. To examine the explanatory power of this residual hypothesis and understand the interplay between the banking and monetary systems, we construct a simple prediction model for excess reserves by breaking down how high powered money is created and how it flows through the banking system.
The Federal Reserve Board's (1943, p. 360-367) conceptual framework for reserve balances is the most straightforward approach for this task. The framework breaks down reserves into its three "sources" and six "uses." New sources of reserves come from (1) net gold inflows,
(2) the Fed creating new bank reserves, and (3) the Treasury creating new currency. The uses of reserves are (1) money in circulation, (2) member bank reserve balances (called total reserves),
(3) Treasury cash, (4) nonmember bank deposits, (5) Treasury deposits as the Fed, and (6) other Fed accounts. The uses and sources must be equal by definition:
. While the level of excess reserves is chosen by banks, the total value of reserves (i.e., all member bank reserve balances) and required reserves are largely exogenously determined by the money supply and individual behavior. Therefore, to judge the extent that excess reserves were a residual (i.e., determined by whatever was left of gold flows after required reserves and money in circulation are removed), we perform the following exercise. First, we estimate the expected value of total reserves and required reserves. We then use those values to obtain a measure of predicted excess reserves if banks simply chose not to keep the remainder as excess reserves.
Using the entire set of sources and uses, total reserves would be:
. Figure 3 , however, shows that many of these items were very small, meaning that total reserves between 1933 and 1942 are largely a function of high powered money and money in circulation.
So, to a first approximation, the change in total reserves can be predicted using:
It is important to note that these two right-hand side factors are relatively exogeneous to individual banks, the Federal Reserve Banks, and the Treasury.
To obtain excess reserves, we subtract required reserves from total reserves. For a given category of deposits, required reserves will equal total deposits times the required reserve ratio: * * .
However, because the required reserve ratios for both time and demand deposits nearly always changed in the same proportion, we can decompose total required reserves into the reserve requirement multiplied by total deposits and attribute other movement in required reserves to a composition factor that accounts for changes in the proportion of time vs. demand deposits. * * Just like currency holdings, individual deposits are driven by a multitude of factors (e.g., confidence in the banking system, liquidity preference, interest rates, etc.). However, because of the close relationship between personal income and deposits in this period, we decompose deposits into the product of personal income and the deposits-to-personal income ratio. * * * Despite other factors, over 94 percent of the increase in required reserves from March 1933 through December 1941 is explained by changes in the required reserve ratio and income. 16 We thus simplify the prediction model to:
∆ * %∆ %∆
Having constructed estimates of total reserves and required reserves, predicted excess reserves are:
The results for this prediction model in the top panels of 
An Econometric Model of the Determinants of Excess Reserve Behavior
The residual model of excess reserve accumulation was based on the assumption that banks held onto all gold inflows. However, we know from previous sections that other behavioral factors (i.e., interest rates and national debt) might have influenced this decision. In this section, we empirically test the connection between gold and excess reserves while controlling for the other macroeconomic factors that could have influenced the decisions of banks. Because of the condensed number of years and observations, we are forced to estimate a parsimonious linear model. We select variables based on the previously described theories for excess reserve accumulation. We control for income growth using United States' personal income and population growth, interest rates using the rate on AAA bonds, changes in the reserve requirement using the fraction of demand deposits required to be held at the Fed, precautionary demand using the volatility of the Dow Jones Industrial Average as a proxy for risk/uncertainty following Romer (1990) ,the spread between BAA and AAA rates as a measure of financial risk following Caldara et al. (2016) , and new issues of government bonds using the logarithm of the national debt. The linear regression model takes the form:
where ∆ is either the change in total reserves, total excess reserves, total reserves as a fraction of individual deposits, or total excess reserves as a fraction of individual deposits, is the overall monetary gold stock, is the vector of control variables described above, and is the robust error term. The variety of dependent variables is important to account for the fact that gold inflows mechanically increase deposits and by extension total and required reserves. While the model accounts for any serial correlation using the lag of the dependent variable, we show in Appendix As highlighted in previous sections, the amount of total reserves is going to be mechanically tied to gold inflows. However, the multiplier on gold will vary based on the actions and choices of individuals and banks. The exact size of the coefficient thus tells us about the environment of the banking system. This coefficient size is even more important for the gold multiplier on excess reserves as banks do not have to hold onto excess reserves, and in most periods they do not. The more banks are hoarding the newly created reserves the closer to one the coefficient will be. Table 1 provides the estimated coefficients on equation (1). The table confirms that gold inflows increased both total and excess reserves even after controlling for other factors. A 10 percent increase in gold increased total reserves by 4.0 percent and excess reserves by 8.8
percent. There thus was almost complete pass through from gold to excess reserves. The inflows even increased reserves beyond the growth of deposits during the period. A 10 percent increase in gold increased the ratios of total reserves and excess reserves to individual deposits by 64 percent and 52 percent respectively. Changes in required reserves are the only non-gold variable that has a robust and significant effect on both measures of excess reserve accumulation. For instance, the 3.5 percentage point increase in county bank reserve requirements from 7 percent to 10.5 percent implemented by the Fed in August of 1936 is estimated to have decreased total excess reserves by 29 percent and the ratio of excess reserves to deposits by over 200 percent.
The larger effect on excess reserves to deposits is the result of deposits being relatively unaffected by reserve requirement changes. 18
The growth in the national debt also deserves mention. While it does not significantly affect the size of total reserves or excess reserves, it is negatively correlated with the ratios of total and excess reserves to deposits. The pattern matches the literature. The issue of national debt provided banks with a place to earn a safe return on assets, but rises in deposits caused by increased government spending partially offset the effect. The results weaken when we use the level of the national debt rather than the growth in debt, suggesting new debt issues helped to reduced excess reserves rather than total borrowing.
As with any analysis at the aggregate level, it is difficult to judge whether the effect of one variable is masking a simultaneous change amongst many variables or is the result of an omitted variable. However, because gold flows were concentrated in one location (e.g., New
York City) we can add further evidence for the role of gold by examining disaggregated data. As stated by the New York Federal Reserve (1936, p. 11 ):
Most of the imported gold was received at New York and, at the outset, had the effect of increasing the reserves of the New York City banks. As in the preceding two years, however, the proceeds were distributed rapidly throughout the country, through Treasury borrowing in the New York market and disbursements of these borrowed funds in other parts of the country. While the Federal Reserve Board does not provide data on bond flows across the period, the However, the reserve flow from the rest of the country due to sales of the securities was so large that the reserve balance of New York City banks still surged. 19 To be sure that gold flows were driving excess reserves, we test whether excess reserves were disproportionately concentrated in New York City and whether gold flows had their largest effect on banks in the city.
Total reserves and excess reserves in New York City banks were nearly as large as the totals of all other banks combined. Indeed, the rise in excess reserves after 1938 and extent of unwinding during the early 1940s was concentrated in New York City. The unwinding of excess reserves was also stronger in New York City than the rest of the country. New York City banks reduced their excess reserves to near zero by mid-1943, while banks elsewhere kept some. New York City banks were thus central to the accumulation and distribution of excess reserves. 19 Because of this mechanism, the geographic distribution of reserves across the United States would be determined by the geographic distribution of the Treasury's net spending and the relative demand for government securities across the United States. This process shows that the level of excess reserves balances was chosen by banks in general equilibrium based on the value of excess reserves relative to other alternative assets that banks could hold Indeed, even though gold inflows were significant during this period, this period also saw large deficits so this recycling process was distributing more than the entire amount of the gold flows in most years. In every year from 1934-1941 debt issuance exceeded gold inflows except for 1938 when the budget was near balance and 1940 when gold inflows swelled due to several Axis victories in Europe.
We further check the gold mechanism by estimating separate reserve regression equations separately for New York City, Chicago and Reserve Cities, and Country Banks. 20 As Treasury distributions and bond purchases were disproportionally made in large cities, we would expect to find gold inflows influence excess reserves in New York City most strongly followed by Chicago and Reserve Cities and finally by Country banks. The pattern of coefficients in Table   2 shows just that. The coefficient on gold is multiple times larger for New York City than Chicago and Reserve Cities which in turn are larger than Country Banks. A 10 percent rise in gold would lead to a 6.7 percent increase in total reserves in New York City, but only 2.6 and 2.7 percent increases in Chicago and Reserve Cities and Country banks respectively. Gold has an even stronger effect on excess reserve growth. A 10 percent increase in aggregate gold would increase the excess reserves by 25.5 percent for New York City banks, 6.8 percent for Chicago and Reserve Cities, and an insignificant 3.4 percent for Country banks.
Confirming the Federal Reserve reports, national debt issues had their largest effect on
New York City banks. These banks purchased the initial issue of the bonds and helped to distribute them throughout the nation. The coefficient on the change in national debt is statistically significant and large for New York City banks regardless of the reserves measure, yet is only marginally significant in a few other specifications. Similarly, the effect of reserve requirements is larger in New York City than Chicago, Reserve Cities and Country banks. 21
The Determinants of Gold Flows
Up until now, we have focused on the explanatory power of gold inflows on excess reserves, arguing that the flows were due to largely exogenous political or foreign events. This exogeneity is important to separate the arrival of gold from domestic factors that could encourage excess reserves holdings. In this section, we provide narrative and empirical evidence that exchange rate risk, speculation, and war drove the gold inflows rather than domestic events.
We start by examining the determinants of the large spikes in gold inflows seen in the monthly data in Figure 4 . After Roosevelt raised the gold price at the Treasury, there are nine 20 Because it was not a center for gold inflows, we combined Chicago with the Reserve City Banks. However, when Chicago is combined with New York City, the effect of gold still holds. 21 Shown in Appendix Table A .3, we re-estimate the regressions using required reserves as the dependent variable instead of total or excess reserves. Required reserves are positively correlated with gold, but as predicted, the magnitudes are much smaller than those found for total or excess reserves and are relatively similar across locations. As the coefficients on the remaining variables are not significant in more than one specification, the required reserve ratio seems to be the primary determinant of required reserve behavior. 22 We consult archival evidence and the secondary literature around each of these dates.
The New York Federal Reserve (1936, p.11) describes that the gold flows in the mid-1930s were driven by "the persistence of uncertainties in the European monetary and economic situation and more especially in the European political situation." Many of the originating gold exporting nations were part of the gold bloc and were among the last countries to remain on the gold standard (Bernanke and James 1991; Eichengreen 1996) . Belgium's devaluation put intense pressure on France to do the same as it made the franc even more overvalued in late 1935 and early 1936 (Bloomfield, 1950, p.15) . A trickle of gold out of France turned into a rush in June 1936 with the signing of the Matignon Accords in France.
These labor agreements, signed in the wake of a left-wing electoral victory, strengthened labor's right to collective bargaining, reduced hours, and raised wages. This in turn led to a burst of inflation and a further overvaluation of the franc. Indeed, France devalued before the end of the year.
Gold inflows spiked again in the Fall of 1936 on speculation that there would be a retreat from the gold standard in the gold bloc countries. The spike in October of 1936, corresponds to the signing of the tripartite agreement and the devaluation of the French franc and other gold bloc currencies on September 26, 1936 (New York Federal Reserve 1936 . It might seem strange to see net gold inflows to the United States rather than large outflows towards France after devaluation, but the franc was considered "sick". In the context of labor unrest and balance of payment deficits, the franc continued a steady depreciation until it was pegged to the pound in November 1938 (Bloomfield 1950, p. 16) .
While in hindsight the United States was committed to $35 an ounce price for gold, this did not prevent speculative gold flows due to expectations that this price would be changed. The June 1937 spike in gold inflows corresponded to the so-called "gold scare". Speculators feared a reduction in the dollar price of gold and preferred to lock in the old, higher price (Kindleberger 1986, pp. 265-269) . The New York Federal Reserve (1937, p. 19 ) describes that the inflows were "due to a large transfer of short term banking funds to New York, stimulated partly by rumors abroad of an upward revaluation of the dollar through a reduction in the American gold price".
Conversely, as the United States' Recession worsened in the Fall of 1937 and policymakers indicated a return to expansionary policies, there was a "dollar scare" that caused large reductions in gold flows. Specifically, speculators postponed gold shipments to the United States in case of another devaluation intended to stimulate the American economy (New York Federal Reserve 1938, p. 7; Bloomfield 1950, p. 146) .
Gold flows picked up again in 1938 as a direct result of the run up to WWII. The New York Federal Reserve (1938, pp. 7-8) The unprecedented volume of the gold movement to this country during 1940 was attributable largely to (1) heavy shipments for British account to provide dollar assets for the purchase of war materials and for the construction and equipment of plants with which to produce such materials, (2) large shipments from France for similar purposes during the first half of the year, (3) the transfer of monetary reserves from a number of European countries to the United States for safekeeping, and (4) gold shipments from other countries for the settlement of adverse balances of payments in the international accounts of such countries. As the quote suggests, in addition to the inflow of monetary gold we consider, transfers of gold from foreign governments' official holdings surged from $8.8 million in 1935 to $1.2 billion in 1939 and $2.2 billion in 1941, suggesting that the United States was considered by foreign governments to be a safe haven (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 1943, p. 536) . Money also flowed in to take advantage of the United States' developed and still functioning securities markets.
Unfortunately, little data exist on the origin country of gold flows that would allow us to trace a path from each corresponding event to the United States. Instead, data only exist on the direct country from which the gold entered the United States. Even before the War, most gold went directly or indirectly through the major gold markets of France, the UK, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Belgium. Therefore, many transfers that appear to be from the UK, for example, actually represent non-UK residents with British bank accounts acquiring dollar deposits or securities (Bloomfield 1950, pp. 9-10) . France, having a fixed exchange rate to gold, The archival evidence suggests that the large inflows of gold into the United States were the result of exogenous international factors relating to concern of devaluation or war. If true, 23 Under Operation Fish in 1939 and 1940, the UK transferred nearly all of its gold reserves by boat to Canada for safekeeping and to allow for purchase of American goods (Draper 1979) . The cessation of gold inflows after 1941 also was assisted by the Lend-Lease Agreement in 1941 meant that allowed the UK to purchase armaments with alternate payments to gold (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, p. 550-551) . 24 The United States gold reserves increases from 37 percent of reported world gold reserves in February 1934 to 54 percent in October 1937 to 78 percent in December 1941 (Board of Governors 1943, pp. 546-549, 552-555) .
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then the flows of gold should not be related to any of the United States macroeconomic factors that we have examined in previous sections. We, therefore, re-estimate equation (1) putting the change in gold on the left-hand side instead of on the right. The results in Table A .3 provide additional evidence that gold flows were not significantly related to changes in any of the macroeconomic variables. Therefore, while international depositors might have chosen the United States for its relatively stable economy, the relative differences were not primarily "pulled" by domestic conditions in the United States.
Conclusion
Several conclusions arise from our examination of excess reserves during the Great Depression. One is that banks largely responded to developments outside of the banking system.
The primary impetus for monetary stimulus, gold flows from abroad, occurred due to instabilities in Europe related to either the ongoing breakdown of the interwar gold standard or the run up to WWII. In turn, banks made loans based on economic conditions, but kept large excess reserve balances as gold flows exceeded their appetite for new investment. While we cannot show causality directly, investment seems to have responded to economic developments at the national or world-level, rather than being the primary cause for the acceleration in economic growth. As a result, a simple residual model based on factors exogeneous to the banking system predicts actual reserve changes well. In fact, the model only performs well during the Great Depression when these very specific conditions were operative. At no point did the unwinding of excess reserves cause an explosion of lending or inflation as critics of these QE policies fear.
The narrative even suggests that Fed policy-makers exacerbated issues with excess reserves by prematurely pursuing contractionary policy. A coordinated monetary and fiscal policy tightening meant to reduce excess reserves and insure against a rise in inflationincluding sterilizing gold inflows, a return to a more balanced budget, and a reserve requirement increase-corresponds to the Recession of 1937-1938 and a rebound in excess reserves. As such, it seems that it was not until the inflows of gold ceased and policy-makers allowed excess reserves to fall naturally that the problem was resolved.
Facing a similar large balance sheet and excess reserves in the 2010s as it did in the 1930s, the Fed has indicated how it intends to "normalize" policy. The primary tool that will prevent a burst of lending once credit conditions normalize is the Fed's ability to pay a positive 21 interest rate on reserve balances. This interest rate, which will rise in tandem with the fed funds rate, will increase the opportunity cost of lending and allow for expanded excess reserve balances despite positive lending rates (Keister and McAndrews 2009; Kahn 2010) . This policy will also allow the Federal Reserve's expanded balance sheet to shrink gradually as its assets come due over time rather than with massive open-market sales (Ihrig et al. 2015) .
Based on our findings, the Fed's policy seems historically grounded. The decline in excess reserves in the Great Depression occurred when the government did not try to force the money supply back to normal and instead allowed economic growth to absorb the additional money supply. The Fed's plans for an unwinding without tightening, therefore, resembles the stance taken in the 1940s, and suggests that it has learned from the premature tightening before the 1937-1938 Recession.
Naturally though there are differences between the QE programs in the 1930s and in the modern day. First, the size and expansion of the Fed's modern balance sheet is larger than in the Great Depression. Excess reserves in 1935 were about 4 percent of GDP, compared to about 15 percent in 2014. Second, the modern Fed has used many additional policy instruments, including the payment of interest on reserves, forward guidance, and non-Treasury purchases. These alternative instruments have different effects on the banking system and enable alternative approaches to unwinding excess reserves. For example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) found that the Fed's purchases of mortgage backed securities were more effective at lowering mortgage rates in the 2000s than purchases of Treasury securities were at lowering Treasury rates in the 1930s for example. Though this point is opposed by Bordo and Sinha (2016) who find that these Treasury purchases were effective at lowering rates, in the few instances they chose to do so. As a result of these factors and other open empirical questions, care must be taken when drawing too strong conclusions from the historical period. Table presents the results of an OLS regression. The dependent variable is provided in the column heading. Each observation is a specific call report. Robust standard errors are provided in brackets. * denotes significance at a 10% level; ** at a 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. Table presents the results of an OLS regression. The dependent variable is provided in the column heading. Each observation is a specific call report. Chicago is included with the Reserve Cities because it was not a gold center, but the results hold when including it with New York City. Robust standard errors are provided in brackets. * denotes significance at 10%; ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. 1929 1929m1 1931m1 1933m1 1935m1 1937m1 1939m1 1941m1 1943m1 1945m1 Industrial Production Personal Income Consumer Price Index , 1914-1941 and 1941-1970 . 1934m3 1935m6 1936m9 1937m12 1939m3 1940m6 1941m9 Excess Reserves Gold Flows Domestic Gold Production , 1914-1941 and 1941-1970. , 1914-1941 and 1941-1970 , 1914-1941 and 1941-1970 Predicted Excess Reserves including Fed Credit Actual Excess Reserves Notes: Table presents the results of an OLS regression. The dependent variable is provided in the column heading. Each observation is a specific call report. Chicago is included with the Reserve Cities because it was not a gold center, but the results hold when including it with New York City Robust standard errors are provided in brackets. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level. Notes: Table presents the results of an OLS regression. The dependent variable is provided in the column heading. Each observation is a specific call report. Chicago is included with the Reserve Cities because it was not a gold center, but the results hold when including it with New York City. Robust standard errors are provided in brackets. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** at 5% level, and *** at 1% level.
Figure A.1: Determinents of Required Reserve Changes, 1933-1945
Source: Federal Reserve Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914 -1941 and 1941 -1970 
